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maritime air power developments have 
from the earliest days of air power histo-
ry fallen between the focus of the navies 
and the soon developed air forces. Already 
from the beginning the communities sepa-
rated, where air power enthusiasts argued 
the supremacy of air power, for the sake of 
creating independent services. Due to the 
early separation there has hardly been de-
veloped a theoretical common understand-
ing between the air power and sea pow-
er theorists. Still today, we find ourselves 
with a clear gap with regard to a cross-
service body of literature and thought be-
tween naval and air force researchers, strat-
egists and philosophers. There exists great 
volumes of sea power literature on theo-
ry, as well as some on air power, although 
few but any on the intersection. Ben Laite’s 
book Maritime Air Operations from 1991 
is the closest to be regarded as a theoretical 
framework of maritime air power, but it 
clearly has its shortfalls and the perspec-
tives put forward there need to be widened. 
Most obviously, Laite disregards the ele-
ments of naval air power in his approach 
to and understanding of maritime air pow-
er, which I will argue against in this arti-
cle. Geoffrey Till’s monumental book Sea 
Power partially discusses the issue, but on-
ly indirectly deals with maritime air power 
as his main and wide perspective is on sea 
power in all its width. The same goes for 
Ian Speller with his book Understanding 
Naval Warfare. Other literature, which is 
more explicit on air operations in the mari-
time theatre, is either empirical or includes 
historical case studies, and does not place 
this in a wider theoretical framework. This 
article aims at nothing less than creating 
a practical theoretical framework for the 
subject of “maritime air power”. 
A theoretical framework of Maritime Air 
Power
by Gjert Lage Dyndal
Abstract
Maritim luftmakt har siden luftmaktens tilblivelse falt mellom forsvarsgrenenes fokus og 
doktriner. Dette på grunn av kamp mellom forsvarsgrener om innflytelse og makt, så vel 
som teoretikeres og utdanningsinstitusjoners naturlige interesse for enten sjømakt eller luft-
makt. Forfatteren argumenterer her for at maritim luftmakt må forståes som både sjømakt 
og luftmakt. Det foreslås i denne artikkelen et helhetlig teoretisk rammeverk hvor sjømakts-
teori legger grunnlaget for å forstå den maritime luftmaktens mål og hensikt. Basert på det-
te utledes et naturlig sett med kapabiliteter: Informasjonsutnyttelse, overflate-, undervanns- 
og luftkrigføring, samt styrkeprojeksjon. Fra disse kapabilitetene, som er varige og robuste, 
sorteres både varige og nye roller av utøvd luftmakt – avhengig av situasjon og teknologisk 
utvikling. For å forstå maritim luftmakt er det fundamentalt og vel så viktig å forstå det sjø-
militære filosofiske teoretiske grunnlaget som å forstå den tekniske og taktiske utøvelsen av 
luftmakt, og vice-a-versa.
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What should then such a framework, 
across the naval and air services, consti-
tute? As there are few who have dealt with 
this exact issue before, the methodology will 
necessarily be explorative and philosophically 
theoretical in its approach. By the very term 
“maritime air power” we see that this is fun-
damentally about the maritime domain, and 
thus should be founded in sea power theory. 
We need to appreciate and understand sea 
power theory. However, it is also air power 
applied – with the principles, qualities and 
limitations of air power included. This gives 
a framework for the discussion towards a 
theoretical framework. 
The article argues for a broad and three-
level understanding of maritime air power 
based on an acceptance for sea power the-
ory for developing maritime objectives, fol-
lowed by a defined level of core capabilities 
and finally a fluctuating set of specialized 
roles for applied air power in the maritime 
environment. Understanding and accepting 
the link between the roles of air power and 
their maritime rationale is crucial for under-
standing maritime air power. 
As the basic foundation is sea power the-
ory, a discussion of central terminologies 
and conceptual understanding of established 
thinkers is necessary for appreciating the ob-
jectives of maritime air power and for fram-
ing the development of some core capabil-
ities for a theoretical framework. This first 
part is a theoretical discussion. The proposed 
and structuring of capabilities and roles de-
rives from this basis. The following discus-
sion of specialized roles are, however, origi-
nal and based upon own practical maritime 
aviation experience, research and lecturing. 
Throughout the discussion, I will mainly use 
the British debates and contemporary doc-
trines as case-studies and examples, as the 
long British history of inter-service rivalry 
and organization of a maritime air force and 
naval forces makes their challenges relevant 
for both smaller and greater nations with 
maritime interests. However, the article aims 
at meeting a wide international audience, as 
this classic challenge is equally relevant to 
most nations and armed forces. 
Defining Maritime Air Power 
In the British case, the Joint Doctrine Pub­
lication (JDP 0-01, fourth edition), the Bri­
tish Air and Space Power Doctrine (AP 
3000, fourth edition) and the British Mari­
time Doctrine (JDP 0-10) should provide 
a knowledge base for students, sailors and 
aviators. The British doctrines, profession-
al practice and academic discussions pro-
vide a great case study relevant to most na-
tions due to its reasonable size of armed 
forces and air power capabilities in all 
services. However, even these contempo-
rary doctrines largely fail to adequately ex-
plain maritime air power and the intersec-
tion between the naval and air forces. The 
British AP 3000, for instance, avoids defin-
ing maritime air power, and jumps straight 
into the roles of anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and 
Aerial Mining.1 Is there not more to be said 
for maritime air power than these few spe-
cialized roles? 
The British Maritime Doctrine neither 
gives a definition nor a thorough description 
of maritime air power. The maritime doc-
trine states that “the military dimension of 
maritime power is delivered primarily by the 
Royal Navy, supported by the British Army, 
the Royal Air Force and other elements...”2 
At least in the former maritime doctrine of 
1999, the introduction made a point of the 
fact that: “An airforce fighter ... may well 
be components of a maritime force because 
the word ‘maritime’ refers to the environ-
ment in which they are operating, not to that 
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institutional part of the UK’s armed forces 
that might be providing them.”3 
From the dispersed understanding of and 
great span between different definitions, 
“maritime air power” might be summed up 
in the following perspectives: 
One often used perspective is the naval 
organic aircraft category often expressed 
by navies, which by the naval heritage and 
physical integration and interaction is ob-
viously an important part of maritime war-
fare. Organic aircraft is a common and in-
ternational naval term meaning sea­based 
aircraft, including anything from combat 
aircraft from carriers to light helicopters 
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) op-
erating from the deck of ordinary surface 
ships. This is most correctly labelled naval 
air power. The old British Naval War Manual 
from 1958 and 1961 stated: “The adjective 
‘naval’ is reserved for matters which are the 
exclusive concern of the RN (e.g. Naval 
Discipline, Naval establishment)”.4 Naval 
air power would consequently involve all air-
assets and operations that are owned, ad-
ministrated, executed and commanded by a 
navy. On the other hand, a great deal of the 
contemporary carrier-based naval air pow-
er, specifically naval force projection by the 
use of air power, should be understood as 
solely air power in many cases, and all the-
ories and principles for air power in gener-
al should prevail. There is no point in de-
scribing separate theories for different types 
of aircraft – depending on the take-off and 
landing platform. A naval combat aircraft 
operating over, for example, Afghanistan 
uses the same concepts and is command-
ed by the same structures as its air force 
counterparts. 
The second perspective states that mar-
itime air power is “land-based air power 
operating at sea”. This perspective is well 
exemplified by Laite’s book Maritime Air 
Operations.5 The book was published in 1991, 
but is still relevant as it is one of the few that 
discusses maritime air power in a conceptu-
al and theoretical framework. However, the 
definition of “maritime” made by Laite is 
evidently based purely on the (then) British 
organization of forces, and the trends of the 
cold War. “Maritime air operations may be 
defined as the activities of land-based, fixed 
wing aircraft in pursuit of a nation’s mili-
tary policy, strategy and tactics at sea”.6 He 
separated maritime forces as land-based, as 
opposite to the naval seaborne forces. This 
has classically been, and still is, an often ex-
pressed view. However, it should be irrele-
vant where the aircraft are based – it should 
be about their purpose. 
A third meaning of maritime air power, 
which is argued for in this article, is about 
all aspects of air power applied in the mari-
time theatre. even though it is hardly the un-
derstanding you will get from reading doc-
trines, this is a view shared by many military 
thinkers, for example Till where he states 
that: “Maritime airpower includes land-based 
airpower intended essentially for maritime 
use whether ‘owned’ by the navy (as in case 
of Japan and the US) or not (as in the case 
of Britain)”.7 There are also some useful ar-
ticles by Till, Richard Mason8 and Alan G. 
Hicks9 which include both land-based and 
naval air power in their perspectives on mar-
itime air power, but these are too short to 
give an insight into its complexity. 
This broader understanding of maritime 
air power is the focus of this article. Whether 
the air asset is organic (sea-based) or land-
based, administered and commanded by 
the naval forces or an air force – the “mis-
sion objectives” are what defines the appli-
cation of air power as maritime air power. 
consequently, the broader understanding is 
clear but there is a lack of a concise defini-
tion of maritime air power. From the above 
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perspective, a cross-service, inclusive and 
descriptive definition of maritime air pow-
er would be: 
Maritime air power constitutes the parts 
of air power which are being applied in the 
maritime theatre to fulfil maritime objec­
tives, as well as achieving the necessary de­
gree of air control for maritime operations 
within this area of interest.
By this understanding, we notice that to 
the extent that there exists a theory of mari-
time air power, this is – or should be – based 
on sea power theory. However, it is air-pow-
er applied and thus a theoretical framework 
must deal with and accept the qualities and 
limitations of air power. This requires lec-
turers and students, aviators and sailors in-
volved in maritime air operations to under-
stand the nature of both air and sea power 
and warfare to be able to understand mar-
itime air power. 
The Maritime Objectives
A Sea Power theory foundation
Sea power is a concept that is hard to de-
scribe. Some of the reason may be that it 
has been a central part of warfare and in-
ternational relations for centuries, long be-
fore the theorists who largely defined the 
contemporary language of naval warfare 
in the late 19th century. Many have tried 
to define it, and some have tended to avoid 
it. These never-ending circles have proba-
bly led to the various ways that the termi-
nology of sea power has been understood. 
According to Andrew Lambert, historians 
tend to discuss sea power as cultural real-
ities of historical studies, while strategists 
and political scientists are concerned with 
the utility of sea power rather than its mean-
ing.10 Lambert argues that we have seen a 
shift from debates of command of the Sea, 
which largely dominated from the 1890s 
till the end of the cold War, to an increased 
focus on power projection due to the fact 
that the West has largely been involved in 
such strategic challenges over the last two 
decades (e.g. the Balkans, the Middle east 
and Afghanistan). We may expect that dis-
cussions on command of the Sea will re-
emerge as the world again becomes more 
militarily multi-polar. However, it seems 
clear that there are some enduring elements 
of sea power including both commanding 
the sea and using the sea for greater pur­
poses, and it is thus necessary to under-
stand these two greater lines of thought. 
The terminology Command of the Sea 
(or Mastery) has been a central part of mar-
itime military literature for more than a cen-
tury. Alfred T. Mahan is seen as a represent-
ative for a fight for Command of the Sea, 
and well known for his belief in the “de-
cisive battle” as the main tactic for achiev-
ing this aim. Julian corbett was in contrast 
to Mahan not so much occupied with the 
thought of command of the Sea as that of 
“communication”. even though corbett is 
viewed as a counterpart to Mahan’s stress on 
command of the Sea and the decisive battle 
as the means – corbett did appreciate it. He 
stated: “First, there is the general recogni-
tion, always patent to ourselves, that by far 
the most drastic, economical, and effective 
way of securing control is to destroy the en-
emy’s means of interfering with it”.11
corbett argued that the use of the sea – 
what he called “communication” – was the 
object of naval warfare. He argued that with 
safe communication as the sole purpose, the 
fundamental requirement was the means 
of exercising sea control for being able to 
use the sea.12 Raoul castex also noted the 
importance of communication: “…(when) 
communication is open, this permits a dou-
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ble action, economic and military, against 
the enemy.13 
Mahan and corbett are viewed as the 
most significant classical writers on sea pow-
er, and their main works should therefore be 
read by any student and reader interested in 
maritime military affairs. However, it may 
be challenging as they both wrote extensive-
ly and then naturally expressed views in one 
context which may be the opposite in mean-
ing in another. Many have since been influ-
enced by Mahan and corbett and applied 
the general thoughts in their context and 
time, and may thus be just as good a start-
ing-point in the discussion of central topics 
of sea power theory, and the constantly dis-
cussed term “command of the Sea”. 
Till, maybe the most reckoned with 
sea power theorist of today, argues that 
command should be understood in a rela-
tive sense and introduced the term “…de-
gree of command” some years back. 
Being in command of the Sea simply means 
that a navy, in that happy state, can exert 
more control over the use of the sea than 
can any other. The degree of command 
varies greatly and is primarily illustrated 
by the extent to which it confers the capac-
ity to use the sea for one’s own purposes 
and prevent the enemy from using it for 
his. command of the Sea is about the use 
of the sea, not its possession.14
Till argues in his latest edition of “Seapower” 
that: “… the value of commanding the sea 
lay not in its physical conquest or posses-
sion…”, and he continues stating: “If mar-
itime strategy is about the use of the sea, 
then commanding it means you can use it 
for your purposes and prevent the enemy 
from using it for his”. 15 These overall per-
spectives are in line with corbett and are 
not much disputed today. However, is it 
useful to use the terminology “…degrees of 
command”? Or is it, rather, a cultural phe-
nomenon or a state of affairs one arrives 
at as a result of a general capacity to use 
and deny others the use of the sea? With 
this, we touch a subject that has been at 
the centre of many discussions on sea pow-
er (as well as air power) about control ver-
sus command. One of those trying to clar-
ify the difference is Bernard Brodie, argu-
ing that command of the Sea is something 
different than a complete degree of sea 
control. command of the Sea is that state 
where one can use the sea for own com-
merce and to stop that of the enemy. One 
may well suffer losses, but nothing so seri-
ous that it will be decisive. Like Till, Brodie 
clearly thinks of command of the Sea as 
a relative term, and ends by stating that 
he “…prefers to speak only of control”.16 
He further argues: “Sea power is the abili-
ty of states to secure, deny and exploit the 
seas for military and political purposes, in 
war and peace – the destruction of the ene-
my fleet was just one means by which these 
tasks were accomplished, not the sole ob-
ject of maritime forces”.17 These percep-
tions by Brodie stand out as a very includ-
ing, sound and useful description of sea 
power. 
Much discussion has been on sea control. 
castex was actually more occupied with 
those nations that were not able to seek out 
the enemy for any large or decisive battles. 
His answer was to build a navy on the mar-
itime strategy and tactics of manoeuvre.18 
This included naval raids on enemy commu-
nication and less capable ships, the uses of 
mines, and amphibious operations. He con-
stituted clearly an alternative to Mahan and 
those in favour of the decisive battle. His 
thoughts are very important for the medi-
um and smaller powers that face superior 
forces. castex’s theories also leads one into 
the arms of Sergei G. Gorshkov. early Soviet 
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strategies (prior to the Second World War) 
have been paralleled to the principles of the 
French Jeune Ecole19 tradition of the late 19th 
century, followed by a classical large-ship 
build-up under Stalin, and finally the new 
thoughts of Gorshkov. The period from the 
late 1950s till the early 1980s saw a build-
up of an alternative but impressive navy fo-
cused around submarines and long-range 
air power, supported by the surface fleet. In 
this sense, Gorshkov promoted much of the 
same fundamental ideas as castex. Gorshkov 
built naval and maritime air forces for ma-
noeuvre and sea denial.20
To conclude, I support the notion that 
one should understand command of the Sea 
in a relative sense. This in line with Brodie, 
castex and Till – who are all easily traceable 
back to corbett’s thinking. It is not about 
possession, but about achieving a situation 
where one safely and effectively can use and 
exploit the sea for all own purposes, both 
militarily and commercially. As Brodie says: 
“command has never meant control which 
was either complete in degree or unbounded 
in maritime space”.21 Based on this notion, 
command of the Sea cannot be a concept 
or aim of any naval forces – as it is, rather, a 
relative term one may use of a supreme sea 
power that is unchallenged on the general 
use of the sea. This is as Lambert argues in 
his historian’s perception of sea power as a 
cultural phenomenon. For instance, the US 
Navy today may say that it has command 
of the Sea by the fact that it can secure and 
use the lines of communication, maintain 
safe sea basing for force projection – and 
at the same time deny most opposing forces 
use of the sea in those areas they define. At 
the same time, it is important to note that 
they in many cases will hardly achieve full 
control of the littorals. 
From general Sea Power theory to 
concrete Objectives 
As we experience that command of the Sea 
is not a concept or something one will be 
able to break down for applicable strate-
gies or concepts, practical sea power boils 
down to the principles that enable the de-
livery of effects at sea and from the sea, 
which in turn are the foundations for those 
aspiring to maritime power, and possibly 
com mand of the Sea. 
At sea: Sea Control – always to an 
accepted risk
In contrast to command of the Sea, which 
has just been argued to be understood as a 
relative term, Sea control differs by the fact 
that it is a definable and achievable aim of 
a military commander. Sea control is lim-
ited in both space and time – and must be 
safeguarded at all times. 
The latest British maritime doctrine states: 
“Sea control is the condition that exists when 
there is freedom of action to use an area of 
the sea for one’s own purpose for a period 
of time and, if necessary, deny its use to an 
opponent”. 22 It further refers to the NATO 
Allied Joint Publication 3.3.3 Air Maritime 
coordination doctrine stating: “Sea control 
depends upon control of the surface and sub-
surface environments (including the seabed) 
and the air above the area in which sea con-
trol is required”.23
consequently, it must be reckoned that sea 
control has two fundamental dimensions: 
 • First, control is about denying the op-
ponent from effectively using the de-
fined area for his purposes and to in-
terfere with one’s own use of the sea. 
(Sea denial may also be an objective in 
its own right. This is discussed in next 
sub-chapter). 
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 • Second, control is about safeguarding 
own operations, military as well as com-
mercial, to an acceptable risk level. This 
includes all the dimensions of subsur-
face, surface and air. 
Sea control includes blockade and barrier 
operations, as well as embargo and inter-
diction operations. This concept of control 
is offensive in nature, where one part has 
an aim of securing a defined area and uses 
his forces actively to expel or direct the op-
ponent. The aim of area sea control is ex-
tensive and will require both great and bal-
anced fleets – still, this condition is not un-
likely to be achieved by any major power 
over a weaker opponent. Today, with the in-
troduction of readily available smart muni-
tions, with short to long range, precise satel-
lite navigation and communication, stealth 
and computer technology, area sea con-
trol may well prove hard to achieve in a 
conflict between greater powers. Till ar-
gues: “…having control of great chunks of 
the world ocean does not necessarily mean 
controlling the littorals. Finally, the world’s 
smaller navies may be able to mount asym-
metric challenges to the larger ones, and 
may eye each other in distinctly traditional 
sea control terms.”24 
In case of more local sea control aspira-
tions, such as for the protection of offshore 
installations, ports and inlets, as well as the 
protection of Sea Lines of communication 
(SLOc) by convoying and escorts, they are 
different in nature. concepts of local sea 
control become less extensive than area sea 
control, as this does not necessarily aim at 
denying the enemy the use of the sea for his 
own purposes – it is, rather, about safeguard-
ing own defined forces and activities. 
Sea Denial
An objective of sea denial has classically 
been the preferred concept of land-pow-
ers or smaller maritime nations. If one is 
not able to secure the necessary degree of 
control, or finds the cost too expensive or 
unnecessary for the greater strategies, one 
should limit oneself to a strategy of sea 
denial. 
The latest British Maritime Doctrine de-
fines sea denial as: “...when one party pre-
vents an adversary from controlling a mar-
itime area without being able to control 
that area oneself”. The purpose is to place 
an “unacceptable level of risk to enemy sur-
face units”.25 
Sea denial is the most likely maritime ob-
jective possible to achieve solely by the use 
of land-based air power and weapons sys-
tems. Air power may effectively deny an en-
emy to freely use the sea for his own pur-
poses. This was a definitive concept of the 
Soviet maritime forces from the 1960s on-
ward – and was one of the main factors 
of NATO’s, Great Britain’s and the USA’s 
strong interest in keeping northern Norway 
out of the hands of the Soviet Union. With 
a Soviet grip on northern Norway, it would 
have had full access to use long-range land-
based air power (with their emphasis on mis-
sile technology) against naval surface forces, 
as well as directly against the British Isles 
and opening a flank to northern continen-
tal europe. This was a Soviet strategy of sea 
denial against the naval forces, rather than 
aiming for any positive degree of control of 
the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea and the 
northern Atlantic Ocean.26 
Then and today, nuclear submarines and 
long-range aircraft with missiles are the most 
potent systems for sea denial on the blue 
oceans. Surface forces may also be part of 
the forces used in a concept or strategy of 
116
N R 4 OKTOBeR/DeceMBer 2015
denial, but in this case we are soon in the 
grey areas where in reality one is fighting for 
a degree of control. For the littorals, land-
based air power, missile systems, conven-
tional submarines and mining are common 
sea denial forces. For concepts and objec-
tives of sea denial, the main purpose is to 
pose such a threat that it will be unaccept-
able for the opponent to carry on. 
From the sea: Power Projection
Power Projection from the sea is also an 
important element of sea power and war-
fare.27 Strategic power projection, applied 
by military forces as “force projection”, has 
ranged from naval bombardment against 
targets on land – to full-scale invasion in 
amphibious warfare. Today this may also 
include the global reach of both conven-
tional and nuclear long-range smart mu-
nitions, as well as organic air power. The 
British Maritime Doctrine defines that: 
...maritime power projection is the threat, 
or use, of national power at a range from 
the UK mainland to influence events from 
the sea. It exploits sea control and mari-
time manoeuvre to achieve access in order 
to threaten or project force ashore using 
a combination of amphibious forces, em-
barked aircraft, land attack weapons and 
special forces.28
The doctrine further states that maritime 
force projection is fundamentally proactive, 
although not necessarily offensive. It also in-
cludes the roles naval forces have of with-
drawing forces or civilians ashore.29 
By the definition of maritime air pow-
er based on maritime objectives outlined in 
the beginning, force projection against na-
val assets and infrastructure on or by land 
should also be defined as maritime air pow-
er. However, force projection for influence 
on the land war will not be a part of mari-
time air power – though still be clearly de-
fined as naval air power. 
Thereby the Objectives of 
Maritime Air Power 
Maritime objectives are the concretization 
of sea power theory. Using the British as a 
case, their maritime doctrine defines three 
“strategic principles” that are clearly based 
on classic sea power theory, doctrine and 
tactical teaching. These strategic principles, 
which may also be defined as the enduring, 
or at least robust, maritime objectives in-
cludes sea control and sea denial for con-
cepts relating to the use of maritime (air) 
power at sea. In addition, sea power is 
about using maritime power from the sea. 
Force projection is an important naval ob-
jective, and air power often plays a cru-
cial part. However, this objective should be 
limited to amphibious warfare and tactical 
strikes against naval forces and support fa-
cilities in the case of maritime air power. 
For ground-attack exceeding the imminent 
maritime facilities, such as docks and naval 
infrastructure, the theories or concepts are 
already well described by existing air pow-
er literature and doctrines. This is a natural 
crossing-line between maritime air power 
and air power theories in general. 
These “strategic principles” and mari-
time (air) power objectives have been essen-
tial since the early days, and are still with 
us. They are prerequisites for and include 
all the concepts of a more descriptive na-
ture as littoral access and force protection, 
barrier and blockade operations, embar-
go and containment, convoying and escort, 
and fleet-in-being, etc. These concepts, are 
variants of the enduring objectives, evolved 
to describe trends in the military and polit-
ical state or focus of the time, but often in 
time disappear or give place to new con-
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cepts. The contemporary application of sea 
power is well discussed in Till’s Seapower 
and Speller’s Understanding Naval Warfare, 
and those books should be a natural start-
ing-point for any students or readers also of 
maritime air power. 
Based on the British Maritime Doctrine 
and the sea power theorists we may sum-
marize that maritime operations include all 
forces and capabilities that may contribute 
to achieve the grand ideas of command of 
the Sea, but foremost the more concrete and 
defined objectives of sea control and sea de-
nial, as well as the ability to project power 
from the sea. It is also clear that maritime 
operations range from peacetime operations 
to operations in times of tension and war- 
fighting. These elements may be placed un-
der an umbrella of two main dimensions of 
sea power: first the aim for a degree of sea 
control (or denial) and secondly power and 
force projection. 
Defining the Core Capabilities 
and (specialized) Roles 
The Evolution
From the early days of aviation, the mili-
tary explored the use of these modern and 
potential platforms – the new aircraft – for 
support of the commanders on land and 
at sea. The first and quite obvious role of 
the aircraft was to scout for enemy forc-
es, both for surveillance of the battlefront, 
the coastlines and defined seas of the mar-
itime theatre, as well as for directing fire-
power from land-based and seaborne artil-
lery. Also, but to a lesser degree, the air-
craft were used for delivery of small bombs 
or grenades at the enemy. Still, reconnais-
sance and surveillance must be recognized 
as the first and primary roles of military 
aviation. Soon aviators needed to think 
about the “fight” for controlling the air, 
both for being able to use it for their own 
purposes as well as denying the enemy to 
use it for his purposes. 
After the First World War, theories evolved 
around the strategic effect of air power. The 
prospects of air power mobility could be used 
to avoid the static situation of the main bat-
tlefronts between the industrialized great ar-
mies. In British, Italian and American army 
communities the thoughts of “strategic air 
power” won influence. In the Russian and 
German armies the use of aircraft in sup-
port of the existing land forces became the 
primary focus. Among the greater maritime 
powers “floating bases” – aircraft carriers 
– were developed. These ship-based aircraft 
first had a reconnaissance role, but were 
soon able to conduct attacks on naval sur-
face forces. Aircraft in use against surface 
forces matured and proved effective during 
the Second World War. Great examples are 
the many battles of aircraft carriers at sea 
throughout the war in the Pacific; the hunt 
for the German cruisers and battleships by 
both land-based and carrier-based maritime 
air power forces; the British decisive attack 
on the Italian fleet in Taranto of 1940 and 
of course Pearl Harbour of late 1941. As 
an answer to the evolving submarine fleet, 
especially that of Germany, land-based air-
craft were also put into the role of hunting 
and destroying submarines with great suc-
cess. During the Second World War, the air-
craft made its permanent entry into the mar-
itime theatre. 
Maritime air power became crucially im-
portant for reconnaissance and surveillance 
for the naval surface forces, as well as for 
fighting surface battles and hunting subma-
rines. In addition, it was recognized that 
the fight for controlling the air domain, or 
at least for self-defence, was a prerequisite 
for all naval forces. Maritime air power had 
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set its position, but there ensued extensive 
political arguing on organization, develop-
ment and fighting for control of the air as-
sets. This has since restricted the evolution 
of maritime air power theory and conceptu-
al developments. As noted, there hardly ex-
ists complete and thorough descriptions of 
maritime air power, be it theoretical or doc-
trinal, at least one that has been adopted by 
naval and air forces and philosophers. 
Doctrinal discussion of Capabilities 
and Roles
According to the latest British Air and 
Space Power Doctrine there are three roles 
of maritime air power: Anti­Surface War­
fare (ASuW) and Anti­Submarine War fare 
(ASW), and Aerial Mining. 30 However, in 
study ing sea power, there is obviously a 
greater variety of roles played by air pow-
er in the maritime environment. The mag-
nitude may be lost if we do not define the 
roles air power should play in relation to 
sea power theory, concrete maritime objec-
tives and core capabilities.31 As maritime 
air power theory and concepts are not de-
fined, there is neither a directly useful de-
fined terminology which naval and air for-
ce literature has agreed upon. 
The contemporary British Air and Space 
Power Doctrine defines a set of “fundamen-
tal roles”, zand introduces the term “special-
ised roles”. The air force understanding of 
“fundamental roles” includes Control of the 
Air and Space, Air Mobility, Intelligence and 
Situational Awareness and Attack. 32 The 
specialized roles of air power are subordi-
nate to the former. And for maritime op-
erations, the doctrine only defines three of 
them as earlier noted: Anti­Surface Warfare, 
Anti­Submarine Warfare and Aerial Mining, 
which is clearly an inadequate description 
of maritime air power. 
What are then the equivalent naval terms 
and understanding? The contemporary British 
Maritime Doctrine uses the term “role” in a 
different way from that of the air force, with 
an overarching three-level split of the doctri-
nal roles of War Fighting, Maritime Security 
and International Engagement. 33 This arti-
cle limits the discussion to the more classical 
roles of warfighting and maritime security. 
At a more practical level, and more paral-
leled to air force doctrinal thinking and its 
use of the term “fundamental roles”, it is 
for naval concepts and tactics common to 
organize and think in terms of “warfare ar-
eas”, suich as Surface, Subsurface and Air 
Control Warfare for the capabilities relat-
ing to sea power concepts and tactics at sea, 
and the core capability of Force Projection 
in concepts and tactics from the sea. In ad-
dition, for the ability to build and maintain 
a good situational awareness, various roles 
of Information Exploitation are recognized 
as a crucially important capability that air 
power plays for the maritime forces. 
Towards a common cross-service 
understanding
As we see, there is no mutually agreed up-
on and established set of capabilities (or 
whatever one chooses to label it) and roles 
of maritime air power. There are disagree-
ments across the service doctrines, and 
even internally the naval and air force doc-
trines have changed their definitions and 
terminology for each revision of the doc-
trines.34 The aim of this article is to try to 
bridge this disagreement. As sea power the-
ory and maritime objectives define the stra-
tegic purposes, it is also natural to devel-
op this into core capabilities more resem-
bling the naval tradition. The specialized 
roles are derived from both naval and air 
force communities. 
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However, the main point here is not to 
create a new set of terminology, but most 
importantly to define a functional three-lev-
el comprehensive understanding where: (1) 
sea power theory and maritime objectives 
lay the foundation, (2) the term core capa­
bilities describes the overarching and en-
during capabilities – often joint – of mari-
time power, and (3) the specialized roles in-
cludes the tactical and technical air power 
roles applied. These specialized roles tend to 
come and disappear as strategic challenges 
change from scenario to scenario and over 
time, both due to political and geographical 
conditions, and not least as a consequence 
of technological developments. 
Consequently, what we may define as the 
core capabilities of maritime air power in-
cludes: Information Exploitation, Surface 
Warfare, Air Control Warfare, Subsurface 
Warfare and Force Projection. 
After defining this set of core capabilities 
of maritime air power, it is possible to me-
thodically define and sort the “specialized 
roles”, where a “role” describes the specif-
ic purpose of a unit in military operations. 
For instance, subordinate to the core capa-
bility of Subsurface Warfare, we will find 
the applied roles of Anti-Submarine Warfare, 
Mine Warfare and Mine countermeasures 
operations. New roles, subordinate to the 
core capabilities, may well arise or disappear 
with different scenarios and technology. In 
addition, there might well be other forces 
in supportive roles, e.g. electronic Warfare 
(for example jamming) support within the 
role of Anti-Surface Warfare. 
This separation of core capabilities, spe­
cialized roles and even supporting roles, as 
separate levels are important for not losing 
sight of the span of maritime roles. Too of-
ten maritime air operations are simply di-
vided into ASW and ASuW, which are only 
two out of all the important roles of mari-
time air power. This is the pitfall if one does 
not first describe a supreme level of core ca-
pabilities. As mentioned, this is an apparent 
problem in the contemporary British Air and 
Space Doctrine (and many other air force 
doctrines), where it fails to mention many 
of the actual roles air power plays in the 
maritime domain. 
The span and complexity of core capa-
bilities and specialized roles of maritime air 
power may be visualized in the following 
model, where the core capabilities are ro-
bust and enduring, and the specialized roles 
are more fluctuating as scenarios change and 
technology evolves: 
AIR CONTROL WARFARE
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Figure 1: The fi­
ve Core Capabilities 
and the contempora­
ry Specialized Roles of 
Maritime Air Power.
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Describing the Core 
Capabilities and (specialized) 
Roles
The first Core Capability: 
Information Exploitation
The first core capability – Information Ex­
ploi tation, includes the specialized roles of 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-
sance. This capability with its three roles 
is important for all dimensions of warfare, 
both for the success of most tactical mis-
sions and for the greater operations and 
campaigns. Information exploitation in-
cludes the process of collecting data, as 
well as the evaluation and fusing of the in-
formation for achieving an integrated in-
telligence picture. In contemporary writ-
ing and concepts this is often refereed to 
as ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance. 
Intelligence operations range from the 
lower tactical levels to the top political level. 
As for maritime air forces, they are constant-
ly involved in roles of intelligence gathering. 
Military intelligence must truly be stated as 
a necessity for military and state power. By 
holding the relevant information and mak-
ing the correct evaluations, the strategic de-
cision levels are able to take the correct ac-
tions. These will in most cases stop conflicts 
before the parties commit themselves to un-
necessary military confrontation. 
Surveillance means systematic observa-
tion of all the dimensions of cyber, space, air, 
land and sea (both surface and subsurface). 
Maritime theatre surveillance includes the 
surveillance of all activity that would be in-
flicted on the maritime theatre. Surveillance 
is conducted and compared over a period 
of time. The maritime core capability of 
Information exploitation also includes the 
surveillance of the air dimension. For air 
surveillance and early warning, both land-
based and seaborne aviation, as well as sur-
face ships are important. contemporary 
Airborne early Warning (AeW) also includes 
command and control capabilities and re-
sponsibility. 
The third role within Information ex-
ploitation is Reconnaissance and this is about 
obtaining information on the positioning, ac­
tivities and resources of an opponent. This 
level of information gathering is more lo-
cal in both time and space than surveillance. 
Reconnaissance is basically all spot-observa-
tion, and an integrated part of most activity 
at the tactical level. Surveillance, as well as 
reconnaissance roles performed by air power, 
are perhaps some of the most significant ones 
for the naval surface forces. In maritime war-
fare the reconnaissance role gives invaluable 
inputs to the Recognized Maritime Picture 
(RMP), which includes the subsurface, sur-
face as well as the air dimensions. 
Today the ISR roles of maritime air pow-
er, both with greatly enhanced sensors, ef-
fective space-systems and a rapid introduc-
tion of new unmanned aerial systems (UAS), 
have dramatically changed the tactics and 
concepts of maritime warfare. To a great 
extent, no naval surface forces are able to 
operate concealed – not even the “stealthy” 
vessels. However, asymmetric surface forc-
es, for example small civilian vessels load-
ed with explosives or armed with small but 
sophisticated missiles, and piracy from fish-
ing vessels still pose great challenges to mar-
itime forces. 
Finally, it is important to realize that all 
the elements of Information exploitation are 
integrated in and make up the foundation for 
the three following core warfighting capabil-
ities of Surface, Subsurface and Air control 
Warfare for securing sea-basing. 
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The second Core Capability: 
Surface Warfare
The second core maritime air capabili-
ty is Surface Warfare. Surface Warfare is 
about controlling the enemy or denying 
him the use of the sea, and if necessary de-
stroying his maritime forces and capabili-
ties. Surface Warfare for maritime air forc-
es may be divided into the two specialized 
roles Anti­Surface Warfare (ASuW) and 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).
To start with the latter, MIO have to a 
great extent become the “daily” role of mar-
itime air forces in peace, crisis and limited 
war operations, especially in the case of or-
ganic helicopters and maritime patrol air-
craft. MIO encompass seaborne enforcement 
measures to interdict the movement of cer-
tain types of designated items into or out of 
a nation or specific area, for example smug-
gling, piracy and drug trafficking. 
For the classical warfighting roles within 
Surface Warfare, they are all embraced by 
the role of ASuW. The common contempo-
rary understanding of ASuW is that this in-
cludes all actions against an adversary’s sur-
face forces or merchant ships in order to 
achieve sea control or sea denial and to dis-
rupt his sea lines of communication. In lit-
toral waters fast attack boats, which are op-
erated by many nations, may pose a threat 
to own civilian shipping and naval oper-
ations. Due to political as well as naviga-
tional constraints, larger warships may not 
be suited to operate freely in these waters. 
Fast patrol boats, operating together with 
larger warships and helicopters, may at the 
same time offer the best solution to counter 
this threat. Air power may (and should) in 
these operations both be tasked for build-
ing a recognized maritime picture, as well 
as for delivering lethal and non-lethal ef-
fects of power. 
Today, there are three major missile tech-
nologies developed for strikes against sur-
face forces. The traditional missiles are wide-
spread, and they are still useful. They are 
relatively cheap, and may actually strike 
most targets except for the most modern 
and larger vessels with effective self-defence 
systems. Today, hard countermeasures such 
as anti-air missiles and guns, as well as soft 
systems as chaff and flares, defend the larg-
er naval vessels. These targets are difficult 
to strike with older generations of missiles, 
unless they are launched for a “missile over-
load” purpose from an attacker or attackers. 
More modern missiles are either based on 
low-signature (stealth) to be able to close in 
on the bigger targets, or are being developed 
to have multiple times supersonic sprint at 
the final stage towards the target to pene-
trate modern defences. 
The role of ASuW is crucially depend-
ent upon the roles of ISR and effective tar-
geting to be able to direct the application 
of force. Non-lethal ASuW includes any-
thing from third-party target-reporting to 
electronic warfare. Third-party targeting is 
a contemporary terminology, but the ideas 
and use have obviously been around since 
the birth of air power. The spotting and re-
porting of gunfire has since evolved to in-
clude specified procedures for voice over 
radios, later for link systems and the evolv-
ing networked concepts. All types of com-
munication are used for this purpose, and 
as missiles were designed for long ranges 
during the cold War, third-party targeting 
became crucially important and necessary. 
electronic Warfare (eW) includes both of-
fensive and defensive exploitation of the 
electromagnetic spectrum for the purpose 
of combat.35 Jamming, an effective role of 
air power, either aimed at electronics, com-
munication or other, is considered offensive 
although still non-lethal. 
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To sum up on Surface Warfare: it is about 
the all-embracing ASuW concept and MIO 
for control of the activity at sea. For ASuW, 
the fleets of aircraft armed with missiles have 
largely become the successor to the battle-
ships for fighting the surface war. 
The third Core Capability: 
Subsurface Warfare
The third core capability of maritime air 
power is Subsurface Warfare. This core ca-
pability classically as well as contemporar-
ily comprises the roles of Anti­Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) and Mine Warfare (MW), 
including Mine Countermeasure opera­
tions (MCM). 
Both during the Second World War and 
the cold War ASW in the conventional na-
vies became focused on the convoying sys-
tem. Operations were intended for denying 
the opponent the effective offensive tacti-
cal use of his submarines against one’s own 
forces and shipping. The protection of forc-
es has been conducted by a principle of ”de-
fence in depth” and has required close co-
ordination between ships, helicopters, mari-
time patrol aircraft, shore-based facilities and 
friendly submarines. Additionally, ASW was 
developed to hunt the nuclear armed strate-
gic submarines that saw the light of day by 
the end of the 1960s. The force of strategic 
submarines came to be a dominant part of 
the cold War stand-off, and thus ASW be-
came central for fighting these warships. The 
strategic submarines did not diminish after 
the cold war, but have attracted less focus. 
Today, as the stand-off between Russia and 
the West has re-emerged, the strategic forc-
es will most likely again come to the fore-
front of strategic thinking. 
Anyhow, over the last decade many smaller 
nations have been investing in conventional 
submarine forces. conventional submarines 
are affordable and still pose a great, often 
strategic, threat to greater nations. Due to 
the strong focus on land warfare and asym-
metric challenges for more than two decades, 
the expensive and long-term investments in 
ASW technology and capabilities have large-
ly stopped. As the gap between submarine 
technology and ASW technology and con-
cepts widens, the classical conventional per-
spective of ASW as a defensive way of war-
fare should come to an end. For the limit-
ed wars of today and near-future conflicts 
between asymmetric forces, the greater na-
tions should, rather, aim for an offensive 
ASW approach. Offensive ASW here means 
operations aiming at finding and neutral-
izing or controlling enemy submarines be-
fore they can constitute a threat. This has 
to a limited degree existed, not in the main 
naval concepts, but more as a secret part 
of the cold War with the triad of SOSUS36 
and intelligence ships in co-ordination with 
the offensive capabilities of hunter subma-
rines and ASW aircraft. For the last decade, 
the US Navy has promoted and used a term 
“hold at risk,” which describes and can be 
used about offensive ASW. A great mari-
time power today must be able to achieve 
full control of the limited numbers of sub-
marines of smaller nations. The convention-
al, smaller, yet powerful submarines pose a 
significant threat to the greater democratic 
nations. Not so much as an equal adversary 
(mainly because of the small numbers) to 
stop military forces in total, but they might 
easily overthrow the campaigns or opera-
tions, as the willingness of a state or alli-
ance to accept the loss of one or a few of 
the naval or commercial ships has its limits. 
In today’s global political and media world, 
the few and small conventional submarines 
have met with a far greater relative impor-
tance – almost strategically. Therefore, the 
greater nations and alliances should apply 
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offensive ASW concepts to seek out and 
control the limited numbers of submarines 
of their asymmetric adversaries for safe ac-
cess to the littorals and ensuring a strategic 
safety of own military and significant civil-
ian shipping. Going out and searching for, 
and knowing their location at all times for 
achieving sea control – this is “holding at 
risk” in offensive ASW. This issue of offen-
sive ASW operations raises the delicate ques-
tion of pre-emptive actions against a poten-
tial capability of another state. If one should 
choose to neutralize a submarine “held at 
risk”, this may well be against internation-
al law and may also escalate the situation. 
This should not normally be the option to 
choose. Offensive ASW, and the concept of 
“holding at risk” are not necessarily about 
destroying (in peace or crisis) enemy forces 
– it is also about knowing the position and 
status of the enemy. Through the use of mar-
itime aircraft and satellites with long-range 
cameras and synthetic aperture radars, or 
human intelligence, one may even achieve 
control just by detecting the enemy forces 
in port. If they leave port, deployable sur-
veillance systems, hunter submarines and 
aircraft must try to maintain contact, and 
if they do so – the commander at sea does 
have control of the enemy. 
For future large-scale wars between some-
what equal forces in the maritime theatres, 
one will still probably have to fall back on 
the defensive perspective of ASW to avoid 
the threat or limit the submarines’ possibil-
ity to operate effectively. The submarine is 
still a potent and demanding opponent. 
Mine Warfare (MW) includes the laying 
of mines, as well as actions taken to coun-
ter the threat of an adversary’s mines. For 
MW, including Mine Countermeasure op­
erations (McM), organic and autonomous 
unmanned underwater sensors for detect-
ing mine threats are evolving. For the sur-
face ships, self-protective defensive systems 
against torpedo-mines are being implement-
ed, but the true capabilities are at best ques-
tionable. 
McM may for aircraft involve actions 
taken to prevent an adversary from suc-
cessfully laying mines by attacking adver-
sary minelayers and by traditional mine 
hunting and sweeping. Most nations use 
surface ships in this latter role while some, 
especially the US, have extensively used or-
ganic helicopters in this mine-clearing role 
since the Vietnam War. Today the US Navy 
further explores this McM role with their 
MH-60S helicopters using LIDAR37 system 
for mine search, as well as for shallow wa-
ter ASW search. For the destruction, the hel-
icopters may use a gun-system of a special 
precision 30mm supercavitating projectile38 
to penetrate and destroy surfaced and near 
surface mines. The technological company 
Thales has even developed mine-hunt dip-
per sonars for helicopters. 
Minelaying, or the threat of mining, can 
either be protective, defensive or offensive.39 
Protective minefields are laid inside territo-
rial waters with the aim of securing friendly 
forces or shores. Defensive minefields laid 
in international waters must be announced, 
and are aimed at restricting or channelling an 
adversary’s movements. Offensive minefields 
are laid in waters controlled by an adversary 
in order to force the adversary to take action 
such as closing ports or re-routing shipping. 
Aircraft capable of carrying large quanti-
ties of mines have been used for mining by 
many nations. This is an important capac-
ity of maritime air power, though it is sel-
dom talked about. Mine Warfare, especial-
ly in the case of minelaying, is clearly an im-
portant role for maritime air power, though 
not too often acknowledged and discussed. 
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The fourth Core Capability: Air 
Control Warfare
The fourth core capability, Air Control 
War fare, deals with the necessary degree of 
control of the air. This includes the prereq-
uisites of radar and electronic air surveil-
lance, command and control, as well the 
fundamental fighting capabilities of com-
bat aircraft and surface-based air defence 
systems from naval ships and land. Both 
naval organic and land-based combat air-
craft have an important role to play for 
achieving the necessary degree of air con-
trol for other maritime forces to function. 
In the maritime warfare perspective, the 
approach to air control is in fact defensive. 
The aim is seldom air control per se, but 
denying all enemy air activity to be able 
to freely use own submarine and surface 
capabilities. 
The navies and NATO maritime doctrines 
define the total effort as Anti Air Warfare 
(AAW), including all defence of friendly 
forces in the maritime environment against 
air threats posed by aircraft and weapons 
launched from air, land, surface, or sub-sur-
face platforms. contemporarily, AAW is car-
ried out by a principle of “layered defence”: 
first, by obtaining early warning by passive 
means such as intelligence and signal inter-
ception, as well as long-range air surveil-
lance radars from land, ships and aircraft. 
The organic AeW aircraft has in the mar-
itime theatre an especially important com-
plementary capability to cover the low-lev-
el axis below the cover of the surface radars. 
After the early warning and recognition cy-
cle, the combat forces of fighter aircraft and 
long-range missile systems cover the outer 
defences, complemented by medium-range 
missile systems. The short-range systems of 
missiles and guns are for self-defence. This 
is further complemented by chaff and flare 
systems, and in some instances active jam-
mers against incoming missiles. This com-
plete and layered AAW system is still a ne-
cessity for ships with reasonable self-de-
fence systems, since even the most sophis-
ticated systems do have a critical “missile-
overload” threshold. 
It might further be useful to break down 
AAW into point air defence and area air 
defences for getting into discussions on air 
power. Point air defence systems consisting 
of guns, short-range missiles and lasers are 
solely for self-defence of a unit, and should 
not be labelled as air power. Area air de-
fences are, on the contrary, an important 
element of maritime air power. Area air de-
fences include integrated medium-range to 
long-range surface-to-air defence systems, 
as well as fighter aircraft in the outer ar-
ea on combat Air Patrols (cAP) in direct 
support of the naval surface force. The role 
and these operations are labelled Defensive 
Counter Air operations by air forces. With 
all these different roles of air power a com-
mander will try to achieve an effective air 
defence and a necessary degree of air con-
trol or denial, which is crucial for other air 
and sea operations. 
The joint effort of Air Defence – or AAW 
in the naval case, is interesting for examin-
ing the intersection, or crossing-lines, of air 
and sea power. It clearly includes roles of 
air power, but it obviously also has a mar-
itime objective for the defence of and as a 
pre-requisite for all other maritime opera-
tions to take place. 
To achieve a higher level of air control (air 
supremacy or air superiority) over any ex-
tensive area in the dimensions of time and 
space – air power is normally most effec-
tively used in more offensive concepts. We 
are then discussing the applied air power 
role of Offensive Counter Air operations, 
such as attack on airfields, aircraft logisti-
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cal facilities and suppression of enemy air 
defences. Arguably, we then move the dis-
cussion on use of air power over into ordi­
nary air power concepts and theory, and this 
may be viewed as a natural limit or grey ar-
ea between sea power and air power con-
cepts, theory and doctrines. We may iden-
tify another crossing-line between maritime 
air power and air power theories and doc-
trines in general. 
The core capability of Air control Warfare 
for achieving the necessary degree of air con-
trol has been – and will be – a pre-requisite 
for all conventional maritime forces. 
Force Projection – a “fifth” Core 
Capability
Force Projection is a fifth core capability. It 
is about using military forces for amphibi-
ous warfare and for using firepower attack/
strike towards land – perhaps even far in-
land. It is about using sea-based military 
forces to actually influence the land war it-
self. In many cases, this includes no mar-
itime objectives. When discussing opera-
tions of Force Projection we often find our-
selves in a hazy area of objectives, reason 
and responsibility between the three mili-
tary services (and maybe even a fourth part-
service, the “Marines” territory). I will ar-
gue that some of the operations of Force 
Projection are within the scope of maritime 
air power, while others are not. 
effective amphibious operations are im-
portant for the safe and timely delivery of 
seaborne forces to a coastal objective. Access 
to the littorals and coastlines have historical 
importance, for example, with the landings 
in Normandy and during the Korean War. 
contemporarily, the Iraqi wars are good ex-
amples. Great efforts were put into prepa-
ration of the landings and ensuring access 
followed by the landings. This was very im-
portant both for opening a new front and 
for logistical support by sea. Amphibious 
operations became less important in the 
greater cold War play, but have become 
the prime focus of the larger maritime forc-
es over the last two decades as navies have 
largely been unchallenged at sea, and there-
fore gradually have focused more on stra-
tegic concepts from the sea. The US Navy 
went from the cold War blue ocean focus, 
last described in their “Maritime Strategy” 
of 1986, through the doctrines “From the 
Sea” of 1992, “Forward from the Sea” of 
1994, the “Sea Power 21” concepts, and 
most recently the much debated Air-Sea 
Battle concept, in co-operation with the US 
Air Force.40 These offensive force projection 
concepts all require sea control forces (ASW, 
AAW, ASuW and McM) for the defence of 
shipping and own naval forces. 
There is normally talk of four types of 
amphibious operations41, which shows the 
width of this field: “Amphibious demon-
stration”, “amphibious raid”, “amphibi-
ous assault” and “amphibious withdrawal”. 
Amphibious assault is the principal type of 
amphibious operation, which involves es-
tablishing a force on a hostile or potential-
ly hostile shore. Amphibious withdrawal of 
forces by sea has often been used to evacu-
ate political personnel or Special Forces. An 
amphibious demonstration is a show of am-
phibious force with the purpose of influenc-
ing an enemy into a course of action favour-
able to friendly forces. An amphibious raid 
is a landing from the sea on a hostile, or po-
tentially hostile, shore involving swift incur-
sion into, or a temporary occupancy of, an 
objective followed by a planned withdraw-
al. Raids are conducted for such purposes 
as: inflicting loss or damage, securing infor-
mation, creating a diversion or capturing or 
evacuating individuals and/or materiel. 
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Maritime forces can contribute to fire­
power strikes against targets ashore using 
carrier-based strike aircraft, sea-launched 
cruise missiles, as well as classical naval 
guns.42 In maritime operations, particularly 
in the coastal environment, air forces work 
in close co-operation with naval forces to 
ensure the most effective use of available air 
assets for air cover and in strike roles. As for 
the roles of strikes on naval forces by aircraft, 
these operations are mainly covered in the 
chapter on Surface Warfare. The cases that 
differ are when aircraft are to attack naval 
support facilities and ships in harbour. This 
strike role, in contrast to strikes against tar-
gets out at sea, requires more understanding 
of air strikes in general: land avoidance, tac-
tical flying for hiding in the terrain, contin-
uous short-range SAM threats, and the tar-
geting itself. During the Second World War, 
Bomber command and US bomber aircraft 
contributed to the maritime war by attack-
ing ships in harbour, production and repair 
facilities and oil supplies.43 This should be 
reckoned as maritime air power. 
Discussing strikes against targets out-
side of the immediate naval support facili-
ties and harbours, the theories and concepts 
of sea power may no longer be best suited 
to describe all elements and their ration-
ale, even though the aircraft may be oper-
ated from carriers. General air power the-
ory and doctrine comes into play. This is 
another crossing-line between maritime air 
power, which is about maritime objectives, 
and general air power concepts. Force pro-
jections from ships against targets far inland 
(e.g Afghanistan) are not about maritime ob-
jectives – it is in fact aircraft operating from 
carriers for purely land warfare objectives. 
This is, or ought to be, more correctly la-
belled naval air power, which is an admin-
istrative and organizational rather than ob-
ject-based description. 
Conclusion: a theoretical 
framework of Maritime Air 
Power
This article has had a twofold purpose; 
first of all to try to define a broad and com-
mon perspective on maritime air power, 
for both students and readers of air and 
naval services, to understand and accept. 
Secondly, I have argued for a conceptu-
al framework which takes its basis from 
sea power theory, but also acknowledges 
that it is air power which is being applied. 
Mari time air power is both sea power and 
air power in nature. 
Understanding the elements of maritime air 
power starts with appreciating and creating 
an understanding of the maritime objectives 
and then, based on this knowledge, appreci-
ating the two levels of applied air power in 
the maritime environment, both the core ca­
pabilities and the applied specialized roles of 
maritime air power. These specialized roles 
come about and disappear over time, as the 
strategic framework changes and technolo-
gy develops. It is essential to appreciate all 
these three levels to have a comprehensive 
understanding of this special field of military 
art, which is both about sea and air power. 
One can hardly achieve a complete under-
standing of the operational and doctrinal 
aspects without a study of the tactical and 
technical aspects of air power. Similarly, one 
can hardly understand maritime air power 
without knowledge about sea power theo-
ry and the maritime objectives.
The study of maritime air power shows 
that it is fundamentally “joint” and thereby 
it is necessary to take into account the differ-
ences in culture, terminology and doctrine. 
The argument is that maritime air power 
must be recognized wholly as both air pow-
er and sea power. The one- service, sailor or 
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aviator, student or reader disregarding this 
has not grasped the subject. 
The conceptual framework of maritime 
objectives, core capabilities and (specialized) 
roles is essential. This split in levels is too of-
ten overlooked, and thereby one often los-
es sight of the great span of roles within the 
field of maritime air power, and their pur-
pose. Maritime air power is so much more 
than just ASW and ASuW, which is often 
stated in air force doctrines. 
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